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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
~
vs
~ Case No. 14384 
CURTIS GARFIELD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with the crime of 
carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-504, a felony of the third degree. 
(R-38) Defendant withdrew a plea of not guilty, and 
entered a plea of guilty. Defendants guilty plea 
was accepted by the Trial Court as being intelligently, 
voluntarily/and knowingly given, from which appellant 
appeals. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Based upon the guilty plea which was intelligently, 
voluntarily, and knowingly given, the lower court 
entered its judgment that defendant be confined 
for an indeterminate term of not more than five 
years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower 
court decisiono 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged with the crime of 
carrying a concealed weapon in violation of section 
76-10-504, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, a 
felony of the third degree. The defendant withdrew 
a plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty 
which was accepted by the trial court as voluntarily, 
intelligently, and knowingly given. (T-6-7). 
As a result of plea bargaining the prosecutor 
agreed only to make a recommendation of probation. 
The prosecutor made the recommendation as he agreed 
to do.(T-7,14,16) However, the court made it 
very clear to the appellant that any discussions 
had between his attorney and the county attorney 
did not affect what the trial judge might do with 
regard to sentencing. (T-5,6,7) j 
After the pre-sentence report was received 
by the court, the appellant was sentenced to the 
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The authorities cited by appellant, Santobello 
Vo New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and United States 
Vc Brown, 500 F.2d 374, 4th Cir. (4th Cir. 1974) 
are only applicable if the prosecution has failed 
to carry out its bargained for obligation. 
In Santobello ye New York, supra, Mr. 
Chief Justie Berger, writing for the majority 
stated: 
"This phase of the process of criminal 
justice and the adjudicative element 
inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, 
must be attended by safeguards to insure 
the defendant what is reasonably due in 
the circumstances. Those circumstances 
will vary, but a constant factor is that 
when a plea rests in any significant de-
gree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be 
part of the inducement or consideration, 
such promise must be fulfilledc 404 U.S. 
at 262." 
In the instant case the promise to recommend 
that the defendant be placed on probation was 
carried out. (T-7,13) 
Respondent respectfully submits that the 
record reflects very clearly that the appropriate 
recommendation was made by the County Attorney, 
and the appellant's rights were adequately safe-
guarded . 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY AND WITHOUT 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR WITHDRAWAL OF HIS PLEA. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in State v. 
Lee Tim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 825, (1932) adopted the 
rule that it is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court to allow or to refuse to allow a guilty 
plea to be withdrawn. 
The rule was later exemplified in State 
v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963), when 
the court stated that: 
"The writer sees no reason to re-
view again the authorities on this sub-
ject except to remark that the sentence 
in a criminal case is a final judgment 
and one who would set aside such a final 
order must proceed as the attacker and 
has the burden of producing convincing 
proof of a fact which consitutes a legal 
ground for setting aside such sentence* 
The presumption of validity is strong. 
Id. at 671 and 672." 
In the instant case, the appellant has not 
rebutted the strong presumption of validity in 
favor of the trial court's discretion. The Supreme 
Court of Nevada stated in Bates v. State, 436 P.2d 
27, (Nev. 1968), that the withdrawal of a guilty plea 
should be allowed only when good cause is shown. Id. 
at 31. 
In the present case, appellant alleges that 
the motion to withdraw the plea should have been 
granted because the court sentenced the defendant 
contrary to the recommendation of probation made 
by the prosecutor. 
To allow or refuse to allow defendant's 
guilty plea to be withdrawn* is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and can only be dis-
turbed by clear abuse« The fact that an accused 
pleads guilty with the hope that he will be granted 
probation is insufficient to compel the withdrawal 
of a guilty plea where probation is denied. It is 
clear from the record that the trial court did not 
abuse its1 discretion. 
POINT III 
THE FACT THAT A GUILTY PLEA IS ENTERED WITH 
THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING A MORE LENIENT SENTENCE 
DOES NOT MAKE SUCH A PLEA AN INVOLUNTARY ONE. 
In the present case, the trial court deter-
mined the defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily, 
intelligently, and knowingly given as reflected 
by the record.(TR-2,3,4,5,6) The record discloses 
a sufficient factual basis for the trial courts 
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acceptance of appellant's guilty plea. The record 
establishes that appellant was fully aware of the 
consequences of his guilty plea. (T-4) 
The fact that a plea of guilty was entered 
because of the possibility of obtaining a more 
lenient sentence does not make such a plea an 
involuntary one* In Cortez v. United States, 337 
F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1964), the court held that: 
"Most guilty pleas are the result 
of a bargain with the prosecutor• But 
this, standing alone, does not viliate 
such pleas." 
In the instant case, the trial court as 
the trier of fact determined that appellant's guilty 
plea was voluntarily given. The trial court is in 
the best position to view the facts and its deter-
minations should only be disturbed if there is clear 
abuse. 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) set the 
standard to be met for a knowing and voluntary 
guilty plea. It requires that a defendant should 
be apprised of his rights against self-incrimination, 
to trial by jury, and to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses. It is clear from the trial record that 
there was a complete waiver of these rights by the 
appellant.(T-2,3,4,5,6,) 
In Brady v, United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
90 S.Ct. 1463 (1970), the court held that guilty 
pleas are valid if made voluntarily and intelligently 
and entered with counsel0 A guilty plea was 
voluntarily made "while aware of the charges against 
hinu" 
In Brady v. United States, supra, the court 
stated that a "plea of guilty entered by one fully 
aware of direct consequences * . . must stand, unless 
induced by threats or promises. . . e" See also 
Bates v. State, 84 Nev. 43, 436 P.2d 27 (1968). 
In our case, appellant was given no promise 
that he would receive probation, he could only be 
assured that the prosecutor would make the recommendation. 
Upon an examination of the record the trial court*s 
decision to accept the plea should be affirmed. 
Whether a guilty plea was coerced and 
involuntary is ordinarily a question of fact, and 
district court findings are not to be disturbed 
unless they are clearly erroneous or without support 
in the recordc Gurule v. State, 461 F.2d 1083 
(10th Circ 1972). 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO ACT ON THE 
RECOMMENDATION MADE BY THE PROSECUTOR THAT THE 
DEFENDANT, IN THIS CASE, BE PLACED ON PROBATION. 
The defendant under point IV in his brief 
states that the "defendant was mislead by the 
prosecutor in believing his plea bargain would be 
accepted by the court." However, the court, as 
contained in the transcript, makes it very clear 
that he is not bound by any recommendation that the 
prosecuting attorney might give. (T-5,6,7) Even 
the defendant's counsel states that they were 
aware that the recommendation of the prosecutor 
would not and did not bind the judge with regard 
to sentencing. (T-19) The defendant was not mis-
lead. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953), states 
in part: 
"Upon a plea of guilty or con-
viction of any crime or offense, if 
it appears compatible with the public 
interest, the court having jurisdiction 
may suspend the imposition or the 
execution of sentence and may place the 
defendant on probation for such period 
of time as the court shall determine.11 
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The above statute makes it very clear that it is the 
trial judge that has the discretion to impose pro-
bation on a defendant if he chooses, and the court 
is not bound by any recommendation that might be 
made by the prosecuting attorney or Adult Parole 
and Probationc 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that from 
the above it is clear that the trial court acted 
properly in accepting appellant's guilty plea. 
Furthermore, the interests of the appellant with 
respect to the plea bargain were adequately pro-
tected « Therefore, respondent respectfully urges 
that the lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON Be ROI4NEY 
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